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Authentic-Caller: Self-enforcing Authentication in a
Next Generation Network
Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Samiran Bag, Charith Perera, Mahmoud Barhamgi, Feng Hao
Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) or the Cyber-Physical
System (CPS) is the network of connected devices, things
and people which collect and exchange information using the
emerging telecommunication networks (4G, 5G IP-based LTE).
These emerging telecommunication networks can also be used to
transfer critical information between the source and destination,
informing the control system about the outage in the electrical
grid, or providing information about the emergency at the
national express highway. This sensitive information requires au-
thorization and authentication of source and destination involved
in the communication. To protect the network from unauthorized
access and to provide authentication, the telecommunication
operators have to adopt the mechanism for seamless verification
and authorization of parties involved in the communication.
Currently, the next-generation telecommunication networks use a
digest-based authentication mechanism, where the call-processing
engine of the telecommunication operator initiates the challenge
to the request-initiating client or caller, which is being solved
by the client to prove his credentials. However, the digest-based
authentication mechanisms are vulnerable to many forms of
known attacks e.g., the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack and
the password guessing attack. Furthermore, the digest-based sys-
tems require extensive processing overheads. Several Public-Key
Infrastructure (PKI) based and identity-based schemes have been
proposed for the authentication and key agreements. However,
these schemes generally require smart-card to hold long-term
private keys and authentication credentials. In this paper, we
propose a novel self-enforcing authentication protocol for the SIP-
based next-generation network based on a low-entropy shared
password without relying on any PKI or trusted third party
system. The proposed system shows effective resistance against
various attacks e.g., MITM, replay attack, password guessing
attack, etc. We analyze the security properties of the proposed
scheme in comparison to the state of the art.
Index Terms—SIP authentication, Identity Spoofing, Self-
enforcing Authentication, Authorization, Password-based Au-
thentication
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, advances in networking tech-
nologies, communication systems, improved processing power
and availability of new tools, applications and software have
changed the way Internet-connected devices, people, smart
systems communicate and exchange information with minimal
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human involvement [1]. The Internet of Things (IoT) and
Cyber-Physical system (CPS) are the major driving forces
in the smart interconnected environment. Though the smart
connected environment has brought a lot of benefits to the
humanity but its success depends on the security, privacy [2],
and trust of the stakeholders (in particular, users of the IoT
devices) involve in the connected world.
Within this connected scenario, it is utmost that sensitive
information should only be originated and communicated
from the authorized participants. The information from the
compromised devices and people would bring detrimental
consequences to the network.
The emerging telecommunication technologies (4G, 5G, IP-
based cores i.e., Voice Over IP (VoIP), Long Term Evolution
(LTE) and IP Multimedia Subsystems (IMS)) are the main
communication technologies used by the IoT and CPS sys-
tems for transmitting time-critical and sensitive information
between the monitored source and the centralized processing
unit. Today, telecommunication systems are also used to con-
firm some of the most sensitive transactions, e.g., two-factor
authentication for the code and identity verification, the one-
time passcode for the bank transactions, proving the identity
in the event of a disaster, and reporting sensitive information
between the entities (e.g., from the electrical grid to control
systems). The emerging telecommunication networks (IMS,
LTE, NGN) and IP-based networks (VoIP) have adopted
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for the creation, modification,
termination, and management of the communication session
between the participants (e.g., source and destination). SIP
management messages are similar to the HTTP message and
are text-based [3]. The SIP-based networks consist of two
major components: the SIP User Agent (UA) and the SIP
Network Server (NS). The SIP UA is the end-user responsible
for initiating and accepting the connection. The SIP NS
provides the bridge for establishing a connection between the
source and destination.
The openness of IP-based networks makes emerging net-
works vulnerable to many security threats e.g., denial of ser-
vice attacks, authentication attacks and misuse of the telephone
system for the unwanted communications [4]–[7]. Authenticat-
ing users in these networks is very important for user security
and the reliable communication of sensitive information over
the networks. The first thing for reliable communication is es-
tablishing trust on the identities owned by the participants. The
original SIP protocol uses the HTTP Digest Authentication
protocol for authenticating the users in the network. In Digest
authentication, the proxy server initiates a challenge to the call
initiator, and the call initiator solves the challenge to prove his
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credentials. However, HTTP Digest Authentication not only
has a high computational cost and communication overheads
but also does not provide effective security [7]–[9] under many
attacks. For example, digest authentication does not provide
mutual authentication, does not provide complete message
integrity, and is also vulnerable to the password guessing
attack. The security of digest authentication can be improved
by adding SSL/TLS to SIP messages but it requires trusted
authorities for the management of certificates. Several public-
key cryptography [10]–[13] methods have also been proposed
for the authentication but these systems require a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) to distribute the public keys between the
client and the proxy servers. A number of Password-based
authentication solutions [14], [15] have also been proposed,
but many of these are found to be insecure. For example, [14],
[15] is vulnerable to an off-line password-guessing attack and
[16] is subject to compromise of old session keys (Denning-
Sacco attack).
The authentication mechanism of SIP should be efficient
(small communication and computation overhead) and secure
against a number of security attacks. Developing a crypto-
graphic authentication system for the SIP protocol without
PKI with inherent properties of effective resistance against
attacks is indeed a challenging task. To provide an efficient
authentication mechanism without any PKI, in this paper, we
propose a new password-based self-enforcing authentication
scheme for user/client authentication in a next-generation
network. The scheme enables the proxy-server and the SIP
clients to exchange their authentication information over an
open and insecure network based on a password without
requiring any PKI. Our scheme ensures several security prop-
erties even under a strong adversary with the use of low
entropy password. The new authentication scheme provides
effective security against different types of attacks and strong
adversaries e.g., replay attack, man in the middle attack,
password guessing attack, etc. We comprehensively analyze
the security properties of the proposed scheme and compare
them with the state of the art. Further, we prototype the
protocol and analyze its performance for computation and
communication overheads. The results show that the scheme
does not incur high bandwidth and computation overheads.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents an overview of the proposed scheme followed
by a comprehensive discussion on the security properties of
the scheme in Section III. Section IV provides complexity
analysis. Section V reviews the existing authentication mech-
anisms.The conclusion is made in Section VI.
II. AUTHENTIC CALL: SELF-ENFORCING
AUTHENTICATION IN MODERN NEXT GENERATION
NETWORKS
In this paper, we aim to explore a lightweight cryptographic
solution to authenticate the client in a next-generation telecom-
munication network without requiring any PKI. The new
authentication scheme allows the proxy server to authenticate
the SIP client based on a shared low-entropy password and the
authentication process remains consistent within the message
structure of SIP RFC-3261 [3].
Fig. 1: Authentication Mechanism in NGN
A. Authentication In Next-Generation Networks
Authentication process provides a mechanism to verify that
a caller or the callee possess the credentials he claims. In
NGN, SIP protocol uses a challenge-response based authen-
tication process for authenticating the end-user. It is similar
to the digest authentication as used in the HTTP protocol and
employs an MD5 hash algorithm to encode the user credentials
(username, realm, password, digest URI). The building block
of the SIP authentication process is shown in Figure 1. The
proxy server or the call processing engine on receiving the
call request or registration request initiates a challenge to the
caller, which he has to solve correctly in-order to authenticate
and associate himself with the proxy server.
Table I: Notations & abbreviations
G Group of prime order
g Random generator of G
OFF-ADA Offline active dictionary attack
OFF-PDA Offline passive dictionary attack
FOR-SEC Forward secrecy
ON-DA Online dictionary attack
REP Replay attack
D Dictionary of passwords
p, q Prime numbers
H Hash function
s The shared password between the SIP client
and proxy server
DHg(A,B) The Diffie-Hellman of A and B with respect
to g
Z Zero knowledge proof of knowledge
B. Overview of Self-enforcing Authentication Scheme
In a Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE)
scheme, two or more parties (between a client and a server
or between two clients) authenticate themselves to each other
based on their knowledge of a password. The parties estab-
lish a cryptographic session key by exchanging a series of
messages between themselves. The unauthorized party in this
process (one who controls the communication channel but
does not hold the password) could not provide the successful
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(a) Successful Authentication (b) Failed Authentication
Fig. 2: Call Flow Sequence for the authenticated and non-authenticated caller.
authentication and also could not guess the password. Our
scheme is based on the Password Authenticated Key Exchange
by Juggling protocol (or J-PAKE) [17]. Table I gives all the
notations that are used in this paper. The J-PAKE protocol
allows two parties to establish a secure and authenticated
communication based on their low-entropy shared password
without requiring a PKI. The J-PAKE protocol uses the Zero-
Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) (i.e., Schnorr’s signature [18]) to
prove that parties are honestly following the protocol specifi-
cation. J-PAKE consists of two rounds and it works as follows.
Let G denote a subgroup of Z∗
P
of prime order q in which the
Decision Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is intractable. Here p
and q are large primes, satisfying q | p−1. Let g be a generator
in G. The parties i.e. client and the proxy server, both agree on
(G, g). Let s be their shared password, and s 6= 0 for any non-
empty password. Client selects two secret values x1 and x2 at
random i.e. x1 ∈R
[
1, q− 1
]
and x2 ∈R
[
1, q− 1
]
. Similarly,
proxy server selects x3 ∈R
[
1, q − 1
]
and x4 ∈R
[
1, q − 1
]
.
Note that x2, x4 6= 0. Figure 2 represents the flow sequence
of our authentication protocol for the authenticated and non-
authenticated client. We describe working of the protocol
below.
In SIP authentication, the authentication process begins
immediately after the caller sends the call initiation request to
the proxy server. The home operator allows the client to use
the network resources after the authentication is successful. We
assume that the SIP client and the proxy server have agreed
on the group G. We assume that the client has set a password
on the system in a secure way. In this case, the client and
a proxy server share a secret i.e., a low entropy password
that can be remembered by the client. The caller initiates the
invite message along with the authentication credentials i.e.,
[caller-ID, gx1 ,gx2 , Z(x1, x2)]. As the proxy server receives
the call request from the client, it generates the authentication
required message to the client with the following information
[gx3 , gx4 , g(x1+x2+x3)·x4·s , Z(x3, x4) and Z(x4 · s)]. Upon
receiving the call authentication requests, the client generates
a new invite message with the authentication credentials. The
authentication message from the client to proxy server contains
the following [g(x1+x3+x4)·x2·s, Z(x2·s)] andH(H(k)) where
k = H(g(x1+x3)x2x4s). The H is a secure hash function.
The proxy server upon receiving the new call setup mes-
sage with the hash value and other authentication creden-
tials would also compute its hash value as H(H(k) where
k = H(g(x1+x3)x2x4s) and compare it with the received hash
value. The proxy server authenticates the caller if both hash
values are the same and sends back H(k) as confirmation that
the authentication is successful; otherwise, the proxy sends
authentication failure to the client and disconnects the call
request. The derived key k will serve as the mutual key
between the client and the proxy server.
C. Construction of SIP Authentication Messages
The signaling messages to perform the authentication pro-
cess are shown in Figure 2. With all of this self-enforcing
authentication without PKI, the proposed scheme is compatible
with the SIP RFC 3261 messages and it can be easily adaptable
to any future change in the protocol by only embedding
authentication parameters in the core SIP messages. The
construction of SIP messages is explained below.
Step 1. Client → Proxy Server: The SIP client generates
a SIP invite or registration message for the proxy server it
directly registered with. Alice is the call initiator and bob is
the call receiver. Alice generates the invite message with the
following authentication credentials:
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INVITE sip:bob@example1.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP client.example1.com:5060
;branch=z9hG4bK74b03, Max-Forwards: 70
From Alice: sip:alice@example1.com;tag=9fxced76sl,
Authentication Credentials: gx1 , gx2 , Z(x1, x2)
To Bob: sip:bob@example1.com
Call-ID: 3848276298220188511@example1.com
CSeq: 2 INVITE
Content-Type: application/sdp session description mes-
sage (Continued · · · )
Step 2. Proxy Server → Client: The proxy server replies
client with the 407 Proxy Authorization required. The proxy
server also presents its credentials to the client within the
message. The modified authentication message is constructed
as follows.
SIP/2.0 407 Proxy Authorization Required
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP client.example1.com:5060;
branch=z9hG4bK74b03 ;received=192.0.2.101
From Alice: sip:alice@example1.com;tag=9fxced76sl
To Bob: sip:bob@example1.com;tag=876321 Call-ID:
2xTb9vxSit55XU7p8@example1.com CSeq: 1 IN-
VITE
Proxy-Authenticate: gx3 , gx4 ,g(x1+x2+x3)·x4·s,
Z(x3, x4),Z(x4 · s)
Content-Length: 0
Step 3. Client → Proxy Server: The client sends ACK
message for the 407 message, together with g(x1+x3+x4)·x2·s,
Z(x2 · s), H(H(k)) where k = H(g
(x1+x3)x2x4s) and other
SIP signaling related information to the proxy server.
INVITE sip:bob@example1.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP client.example1.com:5060;
branch=z9hG4bf9, Max-Forwards: 70
From Alice: sip:alice@example1.com;tag=9fxced76sl
To Bob: sip:bob@example1.com
Call-ID: 3848276298220188511@example1.com
CSeq: 2 INVITE
Proxy-Authorization: g(x1+x3+x4)x2·s,Z(x2 · s),
H(H(k))
Content-Type: application/sdp session description mes-
sage (Continued · · · )
Step 4. Proxy Server → Client: The proxy server also
computes the key k = H(g(x1+x3)x2x4s). If the hash received
from the client is the same as the hash computed by the
proxy server, then the client is authenticated to the proxy
server, and proxy server sends the ‘100’ ringing message to
client with H(k) for explicit key confirmation and the ‘invite’
message to the callee. If the hash values of client and proxy
server are different then the proxy server replies client with
authentication failed message.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the security properties of the
proposed scheme. Table II presents security features of the
proposed scheme along with other PAKE-based and digest
authentication systems.
A. Off-Line Dictionary Attack
We show that our protocol is resistant against offline dictio-
nary attack by both passive and active adversaries. First, we
consider the scenario where Alice is honest and Bob is the
active adversary trying to attack the protocol. Bob does not
possess the password. He intends to gain some information
about the password that would help him to perform an off-line
exhaustive search for the password. We show that he would
not be able to accomplish this.
Let D be the dictionary and B = (B0,B1) be an active off-
line dictionary attacker against the protocol. Let K1 be the
following probability.
Pr


g
$
←− G,X1
$
←− G,X2
$
←− G
s
$
←− D
(x3, x4, τ)← B
G,D
0 (g,X1, X2)
T = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗X
x3
2 ∗X
x4
2 )
s
s′ ← B1(T, τ)
s′ = s


(1)
Note that we use DHg(A,B) to denote the Diffie Hellman
of A and B with respect to g. As such, the advantage of the
attacker B is given by AdvGB,OFF−ADA1(λ) = K1 −
1
|D| .
Let C = (C0, C1) be another off-line dictionary attacker
against the protocol. Let K2 be the following probability.
Pr


g
$
←− G,X1
$
←− G,X2
$
←− G
s0, s1
$
←− D
if s0 = s1
Abort
(x3, x4, τ)← C
D,G
0 (g,X1, X2)
T0 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗X
x3
2 ∗X
x4
2 )
s0
T1 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗X
x3
2 ∗X
x4
2 )
s1
b
$
←− {0, 1}
b′ ← CD,G1 (s0, s1, Tb, τ)
b = b′


(2)
The distinguishing advantage of C is given by
AdvGC,OFF−ADA2(λ) = K2 −
1
2 .
Lemma 1: AdvGB,OFF−ADA1(λ) ≤ 2
(
1− 1|D|
)
∗
AdvGC,OFF−ADA2(λ).
Proof 1: We show that if there exists an adversary B =
(B0,B1) against the ExpB,OFF−ADA1(λ) of equation 1, it
could be used in the construction of another adversary C
against the security experiment ExpGC,OFF−ADA2(λ) of equa-
tion 2. C works as follows. It receives as input g,X1, X2 ∈R
G. It invokes B0(g,X1, X2). B0 outputs x3, x4 ∈ Zp and
the trapdoor τ . C0 also returns the same arguments returned
by B0. Then C1 receives as input s0, s1, Tb and τ , where
Tb = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗X
x3
2 ∗X
x4
2 )
sb . As such, C1 invokes
BD1 (Tb, τ). B will return s ∈ D. If s = s0, C returns 0, else if
s = s1, C returns 1. If s /∈ {s0, s1}, C returns a random bit.
Let us now calculate the distinguishing advantage of C.
Pr[(CD1 () = sb] = Pr[C
D
1 (λ) = sb, s = sb)
⋃
(CD1 () =
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sb, s = s1−b)
⋃
(CD1 () = sb, s /∈ {s0, s1})] = Pr[C
D
1 () =
sb, s = sb)] + Pr[C
D
1 () = sb, s = s1−b)] + Pr[C
D
1 () =
sb, s /∈ {s0, s1})] = Pr[C
D
1 (λ) = sb
∣∣s = sb] ∗ Pr[s =
sb] + Pr[C
D
1 () = sb
∣∣s = s1−b] ∗ Pr[s = s1−b] + Pr[CD1 () =
sb
∣∣s /∈ {s0, s1}] ∗ Pr[s /∈ {s0, s1}]. Now, Pr[CD1 () =
sb
∣∣s = sb] = 1 and Pr[CD1 () = sb
∣∣s = s1−b] = 0. Also,
Pr[CD1 () = sb
∣∣s /∈ {s0, s1}] = 12 . Again, Pr[s = sb] =
1
|D| + Adv
G
B,OFF−ADA1(λ). Pr[s /∈ {s0, s1}] = Pr[s /∈
{sb, s1−b}] = Pr[(s 6= sb)
⋂
(s 6= s1−b)] = Pr[s 6=
sb] ∗ Pr[s 6= s1−b
∣∣s 6= sb] = (1 − Pr[s = sb]) ∗ Pr[s 6=
s1−b
∣∣s 6= sb] =
(
1− 1|D| −Adv
G
B,OFF−ADA1(λ)
)
∗ |D|−2|D|−1 .
Thus, Pr[(CD1 () = sb] =
1
|D| + Adv
G
B,OFF−ADA1(λ) +
1
2
((
1− 1|D| −Adv
G
B,OFF−ADA1(λ)
)
∗ |D|−2|D|−1
)
= 12 +
|D|
2(|D|−1)Adv
G
B,OFF−ADA1(λ). However,
AdvGC,OFF−ADA2(λ) ≥ Pr[(C
D
1 () = sb] −
1
2 =
|D|
2(|D|−1)Adv
G
B,OFF−ADA1(λ). Hence, the lemma holds.
Assumption 1: The Decisional Diffie Hellman Assump-
tion AdvGA,DDH(λ) = M −
1
2 ≤ negl(λ). where M is the
below probability:
Pr


g
$
←− G,A
$
←− G,B
$
←− G
T0 = DHg(A,B)
T1
$
←− G
b
$
←− {0, 1}
b′ ← A(g, Tb, A,B)
(b = b′)


(3)
Assumption 2:
AdvGA,SDDH(λ) = L−
1
2 , where L is the below probability.
Pr


g
$
←− G,A
$
←− G,B
$
←− G
(r, x, τ)← A0(g,A,B)
if x = 0 ∨ x = 1
Abort
Ω0 = DHg(A,B) ∗B
r
Ω1 = (DHg(A,B) ∗B
r)x
b
$
←− {0, 1}
b′ ← A1(Ωb, τ, x)
b = b′


(4)
Lemma 2: AdvGA,SDDH(λ) ≤ Adv
G
A,DDH(λ).
Proof 2: If x 6= 0, then DHg(A,B)
x is a non-
identity element of G. Now according to Assumption
1, (g,A,B,DHg(A,B) ∗ B
r)
c
≈ (g,A,B,R ∗ Br)
c
≈
(g,A,B,R)
c
≈ (g,A,B,R ∗ (DHg(A,B) ∗ B
r)x)
c
≈
(g,A,B,DHg(A,B) ∗ B
r ∗ (DHg(A,B) ∗ B
r)x)
c
≈
(g,A,B, (DHg(A,B) ∗B
r)1+x).
Lemma 3: AdvGC,OFF−ADA2(λ) ≤ Adv
G
A,SDDH(λ).
Proof 3: We show that if there exists an adversary C =
(C0, C1) against the security experiment ExpC,OFF−ADA2(λ),
it could be used to construct another adversary A against
Assumption 2. A works as follows:
It receives as input g,A,B ∈R Zp. Then it invokes C0 with
the inputs g,X1 = A,X2 = B. C0 returns (x3, x4, τ). A0
computes r = x3 + x4, x = s1/s0 − 1, where s1 and s0
are randomly chosen by A0 from D. It returns r, x and τ .
Since, s0 6= s1, x 6= 0. Now, A1 will receive the challenge
Ωb ∈ {Ω0,Ω1}. Here, Ω0 = DHg(A,B) ∗ X
x3+x4
2 , and
Ω1 = (DHg(A,B) ∗ X
x3+x4
2 )
1+x. A computes Tb = Ω
s0
b .
Note that if b = 0, then Ω0 = DHg(A,B) ∗ X
x3+x4
2
and Tb = DHg(A,B) ∗ X
x3
2 ∗ X
x4
2 = T0. Alternatively,
if b = 1, then Ω1 = (DHg(A,B) ∗ X
x3+x4
2 )
1+x and
Tb = (DHg(A,B) ∗ X
x3
2 ∗ X
x4
2 )
s1 = T1. Now, A1 invokes
C1(s0, s1, Tb, τ). It will return a bit b
′. A will return the same
bit. It is easy to see that the success probability of A is at
least that of C. Hence, the result holds.
Now, we consider a passive adversary who intercepts the
messages being passed between the participants and tries to
infer information about the password through off-line exhaus-
tive search.
Let, the distinguishing advantage of the passive
off-line attacker be AdvGB,OFF−PDA1(λ) =
Pr[ExpGB,OFF−PDA1(λ)] −
1
|D| , where
Pr[ExpGB,OFF−PDA1(λ)] is the below probability.
Pr


g
$
←−, X1
$
←− G,X2
$
←− G,X3
$
←− G,X4
$
←− G
s
$
←− D
T1 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗DHg(X2, X3) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
T2 = (DHg(X3, X4) ∗DHg(X1, X4) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
C = (T1, T2)
s′ ← BG,D(C, g,X1, X2, X3, X4)
s = s′


(5)
Let C be a passive adversary against the protocol of
equation 6. The advantage of the adversary C is given by
AdvG,DB,OFF−PDA2(λ) = Pr[Exp
G,D
B,OFF−PDA2(λ)]−
1
2 , where
Pr[ExpG,DB,OFF−PDA2(λ)] is the following probability:
Pr


g
$
←−, X1
$
←− G,X2
$
←− G,X3
$
←− G,X4
$
←− G
(s0, s1)
$
←− D
if s0 = s1
Abort
T1 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗DHg(X2, X3) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s0
T2 = (DHg(X3, X4) ∗DHg(X1, X4) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s0
T3 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗DHg(X2, X3) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s1
T4 = (DHg(X3, X4) ∗DHg(X1, X4) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s1
C0 = (T1, T2), C1 = (T3, T4)
b
$
←− {0, 1}
b′ ← CG,D(Cb, s0, s1, g,X1, X2, X3, X4)
b = b′


(6)
Lemma 4: AdvGB,OFF−PDA1(λ) ≤ 2(1 −
1
|D| )Adv
G
C,OFF−PDA2(λ).
Proof 4: The proof is same as the proof of Lemma 1
B. On-line Dictionary Attack
In this section, we show that our scheme is secure against
an online dictionary attack. Consider the following security
experiment.
The advantage of the adversary B in computing the secret
key is given by AdvG,DB,ON−DA(λ) = Pr
[
ExpG,DB,ON−DA(λ)
]
−
1
|D| .
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Exp
G,D
B,ON−DA
(λ)
g,X1, X2,
$
←− G
(x3, x4, τ) = B
G,D
0
(g,X1, X2)
s
$
←− D
T =
(
DHg(X1, X2) ∗X
x3
2
∗X
x4
2
)s
L = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗X
x3
2
)x4s
L′ = BG,D
1
(T, τ)
Return L = L′
Lemma 5: AdvG,DB,ON−DA(λ) ≤ Adv
G,D
A,OFF−ADA1(λ).
Proof 5: We show that if there exists an on-line dictionary
attacker B = (B0,B1), then it could be used to construct
an adversary A = (A0,A1) against the security experi-
ment ExpGA,OFF−ADA1(λ). A works as follows. When A0
receives g,X1, X2, it invokes B
G,D
0 (g,X1, X2). It returns
x3, x4, τ
′ = τ
⋃
{x3, x4}. A0 returns the same arguments.
Then A1 receives as input T, τ
′, where T = (DHg(X1, X2)∗
Xx32 ∗ X
x4
2 )
s for some s ∈ D. A1 invokes B
G,D
1 (T, τ).
B1 will return L = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗ X
x3
2 )
x4s. Now, A1
computes Xs2 = (T
x4/L)1/x
2
4 . Now, A can find s using
brute force search over all the elements in D. This search
will be feasible since |D| ∈ poly(λ). Now, A1 can output
s. Pr[ExpG,DA,OFF−ADA1(λ) = 1] = Pr[A0(T, τ
′) = s] ≥
Pr[B1(T, τ) = L] = Pr[Exp
G,D
B,ON−DA(λ) = 1]. Hence,
AdvG,DA,OFF−ADA1(λ) ≥ Adv
G,D
B,ON−DA(λ).
Thus, the attacker would not be able to establish the correct
secret key if it chooses a wrong password.
C. Forward Secrecy
In this section, we show that our scheme provides forward
secrecy. Hence, if an attacker gets to learn the shared password
between the two parties, she will be able to compromise the
secret keys of previous sessions with negligible probability.
Let, B be an attacker against the forward secrecy property
of our scheme. As such, the advantage of the adversary to
compromised a previously computed shared key is given by
AdvG,DB,FOR−SEC(λ) = Pr
[
ExpG,DB,FOR−SEC(λ) = 1
]
. Our
scheme is forward-secure if the following holds.
AdvG,DB,FOR−SEC(λ) ≤ negl(λ)
Exp
G,D
B,FOR−SEC
(λ)
g
$
←−, X1
$
←− G,X2
$
←− G,X3
$
←− G,X4
$
←− G
s
$
←− D
L1 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗DHg(X2, X3) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
L2 = (DHg(X3, X4) ∗DHg(X1, X4) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
B = DHg(X1 ∗X3, X2, X4)s
B′ = BG,D(g,X1, X2, X3, X4, L1, L2, s)
Return B=B’
Assumption 3:
According to the Computation Diffie Hellman as-
sumption, for all PPT adversary A, AdvGA,CDH(λ) =
Pr[ExpGA,CDH(λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ).
Lemma 6: AdvG,DB,FOR−SEC(λ) ≤ Adv
G
A,CDH(λ).
ExpG
B,CDH(λ)
g
$
←−, A
$
←− G,B
$
←− G,C
$
←− G
E1 = DHg(A,B), E2 = DHg(B,C), E3 = DHg(A,C)
T = DHg(A,B,C)
T ′ = BG(g,A,B,C,E1, E2, E3)
Return T=T’
Proof 6: We show that if there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) adversary B against the security ex-
periment ExpGB,FOR−SEC(λ), it could be used to construct
another PPT adversary A against the security experiment
ExpGA,CDH(λ). A works as follows. It receives as inputs
g,A,B,C ∈R G and E1, E2, E3. It selects a ∈R Zp
and computes X1 = g
a. It sets X2 = B,X4 = C and
X3 = A/X1. It also selects random s ∈ D, and computes
(L1 = E1 ∗ E2)
s = (DHg(A,B) ∗ DHg(B,C))
s, and
L2 = (E3 ∗ E2)
s = (DHg(A,C) ∗ DHg(B,C))
s. Now,
A invokes BG,D(g,X1, X2, X3, X4, L1, L2, s). B will return
B′ = DHg(X1 ∗ X3, X2, X4)
s = DHg(A,B,C)
s. A can
compute DHg(A,B,C) = (B
′)1/s. Thus, AdvGA,CDH(λ) ≥
AdvG,DB,FOR−SEC(λ).
D. Replay Attack
In replay attack, the adversary can use an older key and
he can then replay the messages. Let B be an adversary
who launches replay attack on our scheme. Her intention
is to obtain the secret password shared by Alice and Bob.
The advantage of B in obtaining the password is given by
AdvG,DB,REP1(λ) = Pr[Exp
G,D
B,REP1(λ) = 1]−
1
|D| .
Exp
G,D
B,REP1
(λ)
g,X1, X2, X
′
1
, X′
2
, X3, X4
$
←− G
s
$
←− D
T1 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗DHg(X2, X3) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
T2 = (DHg(X3, X4) ∗DHg(X1, X4) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
T3 =
(
DHg(X′1, X
′
2
) ∗DHg(X′2, X3) ∗DHg(X
′
2
, X4)
)s
s′ = BG,D(g,X1, X2, X′1, X
′
2
, X3, X4, T1, T2, T3)
Return s = s′
Lemma 7: AdvG,DB,REP1(λ) ≤ Adv
G,D
A,OFF−PDA1(λ).
Proof 7: We show that if there exists an adversary B
against the security experiment ExpG,DB,REP1(λ) , then it could
be used in the construction of A, an adversary against the
security experiment ExpG,DA,OFF−PDA1(λ). A works as fol-
lows. It receives as inputs g,X1, X2, X3, X4, and a challenge
C = (T1, T2), where
T1 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗DHg(X2, X3) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
T2 = (DHg(X3, X4) ∗DHg(X1, X4) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
A computes X ′1 = X
a
1 (X3 ∗ X4)
a−1, and X ′2 =
Xb2 for some random a, b ∈R Zp. Now, A sets
T3 = T
ab
1 and C
′ = (T1, T2, T3). Then A in-
vokes BG,D(C ′, g,X1, X2, X
′
1, X
′
2, X3, X4) and returns what
B returns. It is easy to see that AdvG,DB,REP1(λ) ≤
AdvG,DA,OFF−PDA1(λ).
Now we consider another replay attacker whose wish is
to establish a secret key with Alice. The adversary intercepts
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the messages between Alice and Bob in a particular session.
Then she uses those messages to launch replay attack with the
intention to establish a shared key with Alice. We consider the
following security experiment ExpG,DB,REP2(λ). The advantage
of the adversary B in being able to establish a secret key is
given by AdvG,DB,REP2(λ) = Pr[Exp
G,D
B,REP2(λ) = 1].
Exp
G,D
B,REP2
(λ)
g,X1, X2, X
′
1
, X′
2
, X3, X4
$
←− G
s
$
←− D
L1 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗DHg(X2, X3) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
L2 = (DHg(X3, X4) ∗DHg(X1, X4) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
L3 =
(
DHg(X′1, X
′
2
) ∗DHg(X′2, X3) ∗DHg(X
′
2
, X4)
)s
B = DHg(X′1 ∗X3, X
′
2
, X4)s
B′ = BG,D(g,X1, X2, X3, X4, X′1, X
′
2
, L1, L2, L3)
Return B=B’
Lemma 8: AdvG,DB,REP2(λ) ≤ Adv
G,D
A,FOR−SEC(λ)
Proof 8: We show that if there exists an adversary B
against the security experiment ExpG,DB,REP2(λ), it could be
used in the construction of another adversary A against the
security experiment ExpG,DA,FOR−SEC(λ). A receives as inputs
g,X1, X2, X3, X4, L1, L2, s, where
L1 = (DHg(X1, X2) ∗DHg(X2, X3) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
L2 = (DHg(X3, X4) ∗DHg(X1, X4) ∗DHg(X2, X4))
s
A selects X ′1 = X1, and X
′
2 = X
b
2 for some random
b ∈R Zp. It computes L3 = (L1)
b. Then it invokes
BG,D(g,X1, X2, X3, X4, X
′
1, X
′
2, L1, L2, L3). B will return
B = DHg(X
′
1 ∗X3, X
′
2, X4)
s = (DHg(X1 ∗X3, X2, X4)
s)b.
A will return B1/b. It is easy to see that the success probability
of A is at least that of B. Hence, the lemma holds.
IV. COMPUTATION AND BANDWIDTH OVERHEADS
In this section, we analyze the computation and bandwidth
overheads of the proposed scheme for its cryptographic op-
erations. The client needs to perform around 14 exponenti-
ation during the authentication process. 4 exponentiation for
gx1 , gx2 and Z(x1, x2), 4 exponentiation to prove the ZKPs
of x3, x4 from the server, 2 exponentiation to verify the ZKP
of x4 · s, 2 exponentiation for computing g
(x1+x3+x4)·(x2·s)
and the ZKP for x2 · s and 2 exponentiation to compute
the value of final key k. The proxy server also performs
14 exponentiation to prove the variables from the client,
generating the authentication credentials and mutual key k. We
computed time for generating the authentication parameters
with the single-core of Intel i-7 CPU (3.4 GHz) system,
having 8 GB memory on a Windows 10 operating system. We
implemented the protocol in the Java using NIST curve P-256
and bouncy-castle elliptical curve library for the cryptography.
The client and server take around 30 msec to generate the
authentication credentials in the first round, and 25 msec in
the second round.
In terms of bandwidth, the client and the proxy server
exchanged information to each other in two rounds. In the first
invite message, the client exchanges gx1 , gx2 the Z(x1, z2) to
the proxy server. This exchange requires around 692 bytes.
The proxy server initiates authentication required message
with gx3 , gx4 , g(x1+x2+x3)·x4·s, Z(x4 ·s), and Z(x3, z4) to the
client. This exchange requires 1 kb. Finally, the client sends
g(x1+x3+x4)·x2·s, Z(x2 · s) which requires around 350 bytes
of data. In summary, the client requires to exchange around 1
kb of data to proxy and receive 1 kb of data from the proxy
server for the authentication.
V. RELATED WORK
The simplest method to achieve the authentication in the
SIP-based VoIP or next-generation network is to utilize the
challenge-response mechanism (IETF RFC 2617) [26]. In this
mechanism, the SIP call processing engine or the proxy server
on receiving the call request message from the SIP user initi-
ates the challenge to the user to prove his identity. The client
responds to the proxy server with authentication messages.
This authentication mechanism has some security problems:
for instances it is vulnerable to off-line password guessing
attack, server spoofing, falsifying the identity of the server to
obtain the secret information of user, etc. Table II presents a
comparison of our scheme with other proposed systems for a
number of security requirements. It can be seen from Table II
that digest-based schemes are vulnerable to different types of
security attacks i.e., offline password guessing attacks, server
spoofing, replay attack, etc. It can also be seen that many of
the proposed schemes only provide resistance against a few
features. However, the proposed scheme not only provides
resistance against the listed attacks but also incurs substantially
small overheads.
Several public-key cryptography based systems have also
been proposed to ensure secure authentication. Chou-Chen
et al. [14] proposed an authentication scheme based on the
Diffie–Hellman key change mechanism [27]. However, the
scheme is vulnerable to an off-line password-guessing attack
and stolen verifier attack. [15], [21], [28]. Furthermore, Yang et
al.’s scheme requires computational resources at the client and
server. Liufei et al. [15] adopted ECC (Elliptical Curve Cryp-
tography) to facilitate the authentication and key agreement
between the SIP client and the proxy server. The mechanism
provides mutual authentication and provable security but is
vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack because the
session key is not used in the authentication responses [29].
Yi-Pin et al. [13] proposed the authentication scheme based on
self-certified public keys on elliptic curves. The scheme does
not require PKI for the cryptographic keys and parameters.
However, the scheme requires the smart card to stores the
parameters. Srinivasan et al. [10] use PKI and a strong one-
way hash function to authenticate the client in the SIP network.
However, the scheme is vulnerable to the stolen verifier attack.
Liping et al. [23] proposed a flexible password-authenticated
key agreement for the session initiation employing a smart
card. The smart card holds all the information related to
cryptographic parameters. However, the scheme is vulnerable
to the impersonation attack. Qi et al. [24] improved scheme of
Liping et al. and supported defense against the impersonation
attack. Ni et al. [19] proposed signature-based authentication
and key agreement scheme for SIP-based networks. The public
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Table II: Security Requirements Comparison of schemes.
Schemes / Security-Attacks
[19] [20] [21] [22] [14] [16] [15] [23] [24]
Digest-
Auth [25]
Ours
Resist Off-line Dictionary No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Resist Sever Spoofing No No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Resist Replay No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes
Forward Secrecy Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Resist On-line Dictionary Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
keys are generated through the Identity of the client and the
proxy server.
Jia et al. [30] use random nonces for authenticating the SIP
client with the server. However, the scheme is vulnerable to the
Denning-Sacco attack, the stolen-verifier attack, and the off-
line password guessing attack. Eun-Jun and Kee-Young im-
proved the basic scheme of Aytunc and Ibrahim [31] by using
the random number for the public key which is not happening
in the Aytunc and Ibrahim scheme. Tien-ho et al. [12] proposed
an ECC-based authentication mechanism that protects the user
from the server spoofing attack and session hijacking attack.
The scheme is based on using a smart card to minimize
the computation load, however, it is vulnerable to password
guessing attack. Eun-Jun and Kee-Young adopted an elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem to address the problem of
off-line password guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco attack and
stolen-verifier attacks of SIP authentication. Zhang et al. [32]
proposed an authentication scheme based on the elliptic curve
with the inherent property of anonymity for the SIP client.
However, the scheme does not support mutual authentication
and is vulnerable to insider attack [22]. Recently, Shuming
et al. [33] proposed the scheme on the top of Zhang et al.
[32] that provide resistance against off-line password guessing
and insider attacks. Hsiu-Lien [34] proposed a scheme that
uses a smart card along with elliptic curve cryptography for
the SIP authentication. However, the scheme is vulnerable
to the off-line password guessing attack, user impersonation
attack and server impersonation attack [35]. Hang et al. [20]
proposed modifications in [32] to overcome the issue of a
server spoofing attack. Chaudhry et al. [36] proposed the
privacy-preserving version for [32], [35] based on the Elliptic
curve cryptography.
The successful authentication can also solve the problem of
identity spoofing that causes the loss of millions every year.
Cybercriminals can easily modify identity and pretend to be
a legitimate entity to fool the user at the other end. Typically,
with the spoofed identity, criminals fool people into thinking
that they are interacting with the legitimate entity e.g., their
bank, or the police. Currently, the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) is favoring a PKI-based approach to solve the
caller ID spoofing problem. In 2018, it published a new tech-
nical standard [37] that defines a telephone certificate based
on X.509. This is regarded as the first step towards a full PKI
deployment in telephony systems. A certificate authority based
solution is proposed in [38] where the originating operators
present the certificate of ownership through the call routing
mechanism. Bradley et al. [39] propose to adopt SSL/TLS for
the caller ID authentication. The schemes assume a trusted
server, with which the caller can register its identity through
an SSL/TLS connection. In general, solutions in this category
require a PKI to bind the caller ID with a telephone using a
public key certificate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new authentication scheme
for authenticating clients/end-users in the SIP-based next-
generation networks. The proposed scheme enables the proxy
server and the SIP clients to exchange the authentication
messages over an open and insecure network. We adopted the
password-based authentication mechanism along with zero-
knowledge proofs to perform the authentication process. The
scheme does not require PKI or the smart card for the
cryptographic parameters and has inherent properties of self-
enforcement. The proposed authentication scheme provides
effective security against different types of attacks and does
not incur substantial computational overheads. The scheme can
also provide a way for the parameters to be used for the end-to-
end encryption of speech content between the communicating
parties. As part of the future work, we are developing a
working prototype that involves the real SIP server and the
SIP clients.
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